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ABSTRACT
While the literature discussing public funding of education and the associated
costs is extensive, studies that examine household, or private, costs for education are
scarce. I use data from the 2005 Mexican Family Life Survey first to examine the nature
of these private costs for Mexican families and second to determine to what extent direct
schooling costs incurred by households are significant factors in enrollment decisions for
primary and secondary school students. I find that, while small, direct costs are
consistently significant determinants of school enrollment. Students age 13 to 15 are
more sensitive to these direct costs than are their younger peers. Other opportunity cost
and household factors, such as child employment and parents’ education level, are also
statistically significant determinants of enrollment.
Given the significance of direct costs on enrollment decisions, I examine one of
Mexico’s public education programs, its National Free Textbook Commission
(CONALITEG), in order to determine if it is a sound use of public funds. Using a costbenefit analysis, I conclude that CONALITEG is in fact a good use of funds that targets a
demonstrable obstacle to school enrollment.
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Introduction
This thesis seeks to explore the relationship between education and economic
outcomes, specifically from the perspective of a developing nation, Mexico. Chapter 1
examines the microeconomic and macroeconomic relationships between education and
growth in order to establish the motivation behind analyzing education structures and
policies in Mexico. The evidence strongly indicates that investment in education leads to
private as well as public increases in income. However, there is some controversy as to
the mechanisms at work and much debate over the problem of measurement. Given the
assumption that education is beneficial for growth on a national level, Chapter 2
examines survey data from Mexico in order to tally the costs, both direct and indirect,
that households face in sending children to school, and to identify the determinants of
school enrollment. Chapter 3 then presents a cost-benefit analysis of Mexico’s free
textbook program. Given the national and private importance of education, coupled with
the obstacles that families face in enrolling their children, I examine whether or not the
textbook program is an economically sound use of funds. Finally, Chapter 4 provides
policy implications.
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Chapter 1: Education, Development, and Growth
1.1 Education in Growth Theory
The link between education and development raises a central question: does
education lead to growth, or does growth lead to more education? Despite the difficulty
in determining causality, there is substantial research linking education positively with
growth both on a private and national level. Research in this field is primarily either
microeconomic or macroeconomic in focus with few studies examining both branches.
The microeconomic research explores the individual gains to additional years of
schooling, usually through changes in wages. While most authors extend the individual
analysis to assume that the nation’s aggregate change in earnings also increases with
education, they do not empirically test for the aggregate outcome. On the other hand, the
macroeconomic literature attempts to quantify an entire country’s gains from a better
educated population; these gains include increased wages but also encompass positive
externalities whose benefits directly attributable to education are difficult to measure,
such as a reduction in crime and fertility rates. While the macroeconomic literature more
directly links education with a nation’s development process, it is also more controversial
in nature due to the difficulty of measuring non-market consequences of increased
education. The fact that most research does not evaluate both the microeconomic and
macroeconomic trends leads to some paradoxical results. The controversy surrounding
these opposing conclusions is discussed briefly in the following sections.
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1.2 Microeconomic Literature
The first substantial work done on the returns to investment in education was in
the 1970’s by George Psacharopoulos; today his works still provide a strong foundation
for current investigations (both his own and those of other authors). Updates to his work
in 1985 and 2004 indicate that many of the same trends present in the late 1970’s are still
evident today. Using a panel of between 40 and 62 countries in developing and developed
regions, Psacharopoulos calculates the returns to investment in education (the increase in
expected future earnings for each additional year of schooling) using two techniques. On
an individual level, he uses a Mincerian wage equation to estimate the coefficient on the
years of schooling. Using this method, he finds repeatedly that returns to investment in
education are highest for men who complete primary schooling in countries with a low
per capita income, while returns for women are highest in secondary school (1985, 2004).
Psacharopoulos concludes that across several studies, the average (worldwide) rate of
return is nine to ten percent, a finding supported by other studies. Angrist and Krueger
(1991) use a natural experiment in the United States to conclude that individual returns to
an additional year of schooling are 7.2 to 10.2 percent. Similarly, Duflo (2001), using
data from Indonesia, finds a return of 6.8 to 10.6 percent based on calculations using
differences in regional educational attainment and subsequent earnings.
On the surface, it is reassuring to find that such disparate samples (Angrist &
Krueger 1991, Duflo 2001, and Psacharopoulos 1985, 2004) return similar results;
however, Psacharopoulos is quick to note that comparisons of this sort across disparate
data sets in cross-country analyses are not inherently reliable. Sample selection is a large
concern in wage data, and many cross-country studies do not accurately account for this
shortcoming. In one country, the sample of wage earners may only include government
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workers if earnings data is difficult to obtain from private sources; in another country,
however, there may be substantial wage information for workers in both the formal and
informal sectors, providing a much broader view of the country’s earnings and education
profile. If wages from these two countries were compared without accounting for the
difference in sample selection, the results would not accurately represent the true
differences in earnings between the countries. While Psacharopoulos attempts to control
for the variation in sample selection among the panel of countries (by carefully
examining the sampling strategy and only comparing data sets with similar samples), he
notes that some inconsistency may still be present.
Despite the potential inconsistency in samples, reviewing regional data between
1985 and 2004 presents an interesting trend: average returns to schooling have declined
over the twenty-year period. Table 1 presents estimates from studies by Psacharopoulos
that illuminate this trend. In the developing world, Africa’s average rate of return drops
by 1.3 percentage points while Latin America experiences a 2-percentage point decline.
Developed nations fare similarly with the “advanced” nations experiencing a decline of
1.5 percentage points.
Table 1: Mincerian coefficient estimates on years of schooling (%)
Region
1985 estimate
2004 estimate
Africa
13
11.7
Asia
11
9.9
Latin America
14
12.0
Advanced
9
7.5
Source: Psachaopoulos 1985, 2004

In order to interpret the mechanism behind this trend, it is important to note that the
average years of schooling have increased over the sample period (Psacharopoulos 2004),
indicating that diminishing marginal returns to education exist. This conclusion is
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supported in much of the literature (Psacharopoulous 2004, Pritchett 2001, Eckstein &
Zilcha 1994, Bils & Klenow 2000). If technological progress in the coming years leads to
an increase in the demand for highly educated workers, then the diminishing marginal
returns to education may begin to disappear.
The previous estimates of returns to schooling have not included the social cost
associated with obtaining the education, and thus only represent the private returns that
an individual would receive from consuming additional years of education. In order to
include a measure of the total (social) cost associated with investing in education,
Psacharopoulos employs his second estimation technique. This differences, or internal
returns, method uses the following formula:

differencein wage due toextra levelof schooling
= return
cos t toobtain extra schooling

(1)

Thus, Psacharopoulos constructs social returns to education that include both social costs

€ private benefits. Psacharopoulos employs this method in his 2004 aggregate research,
and
as shown in Table 2. The primary difference in social versus private returns is in higher
education. While post-secondary schooling provides private returns that average 2.5
percentage points more than returns to secondary education, the same difference is not
present in social returns; in fact, in most cases the social returns to higher education are
equal to or less than those to secondary schooling. The most direct explanation is that
investment in higher education is relatively much more expensive than investment in
primary and secondary levels, thus increasing social costs more than private benefits.
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Table 2: Social versus Private returns to schooling (internal returns method)
Social
Private
Region
Primary Secondary Higher
Primary Secondary Higher
Asia
16.2
11.1
11.0
20.0
15.8
18.2
Africa

25.4

18.4

11.3

37.6

24.6

27.8

Latin America

17.4

12.9

12.3

26.6

17.0

19.5

Advanced/OECD

8.5

9.4

8.5

13.4

11.3

11.6

Source: Psacharopoulos, 2004

The result for a developing nation is that an efficient allocation of resources may not
place investment in higher education, but rather in primary and secondary schooling. For
all but the advanced nations, it seems that primary schooling provides the highest return
for the investment.
Although several potential problems exist in estimating private returns to
education (such as ability bias, endogeneity, and sample selection), in recent years a
variety of estimation techniques have been used to overcome these estimation concerns.
Ordinary least squares, instrumental variable, and natural experiment estimation methods
all yield similar results (Psacharapoulos 2004, Krueger & Lindahl 2001) and have
verified the human capital model’s assertion that increased education leads to increased
wages. The rate of return to individuals (as demonstrated through wages) from education
is widely accepted as being positive and demonstrable across income and development
levels.

1.3 Macroeconomic Literature
Although private returns to education are well established, the link between
education and aggregate income is surprisingly much more controversial. Pritchett (2001)
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examines several empirical growth models in conjunction with education levels and
concludes that investment in education can be negatively correlated with growth in
output. This apparent paradox between the microeconomic positive returns to wages from
education and the macroeconomic lack of positive returns to growth suggests that
something more complex than a direct connection between education and productivity
exists. Pritchett posits that workers with more schooling may not actually possess better
skills and therefore are not more productive in the labor force than their less-educated
counterparts. In this case, a worker may still receive a higher wage due to the signal from
his years of schooling, but would not actually contribute more efficiently or effectively to
national income. Both Pritchett (2001) and Sylwester (2003) also discuss the potential
problems created by sector resource allocation decisions. An individual may experience
high returns to education by choosing a career that, as Pritchett explains, is “rent seeking
and directly unproductive” (382); thus, the macro level returns would not support the link
between this individual’s education and increased productivity or growth in the economy.
On an aggregate level, production may even slow if workers are matched with
“unproductive” tasks on a large scale. Sylwester provides insights along the same lines,
concluding that schooling may redistribute resources away from lower-income
households and nations that need immediate capital stock for other ventures. Thus,
although individuals are receiving higher wages for their increased education,
macroeconomic projects may be operating inefficiently and thus creating a negative
relationship between increased education and national income.
These concerns surrounding allocative efficiency do not preclude a positive link
between education and growth, however. As Krueger and Lindahl (2001) discuss, once
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levels of capital and educational stock are taken into consideration, there is a strong
positive relationship between education and growth. Pritchett’s (2001) work fails to
account for the interaction between these two stock variables and therefore does not
consider the fact that the relationship between schooling and growth changes based on
the initial stock of education in the country. Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) similarly
account for educational stocks and find that there is a positive relationship between
human capital accumulation and growth, and suggest that the educational stock variable
may capture some of the macroeconomic externalities produced by education.
Krueger and Lindahl also note that Pritchett’s use of an instrumental variable (IV)
model does not produce robust results, because his choice of average years of schooling
as an instrument for schooling growth does not embody the growth’s true variability and
therefore yields large standard errors. In their own application of an IV model for
schooling using a newer data set to construct schooling growth as an instrument for
education, Krueger and Lindahl find a positive relationship between education and
growth, although the standard errors are still large. The authors conclude that IV
estimates are largely inconsistent and should not be used as the primary econometric
model when estimating macroeconomic results that include capital stock measurements.
Accordingly, Krueger and Lindahl also perform various OLS specifications (using
different rates of return, non-linear relationships among variables, etc.) and consistently
find a positive relationship between education and growth that serves to support their
initial IV method results.
As mentioned previously, even given a positive relationship between schooling
and growth, the direction of causality is difficult to determine empirically. While Krueger
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and Lindahl (2001) demonstrate that initial stocks of capital and education are important
determinants of growth, they do not specifically test for the direction of causality between
growth and schooling. Bils and Klenow (2000) address this concern by creating a
theoretical model where human capital accumulation is a function of expected future
growth, concluding that schooling decisions are dependent upon the growth trends in the
macroeconomy. The intuition behind this finding is that workers expect a higher future
wage if the economy is growing rapidly, and thus it is beneficial to invest in schooling
now (and thus forgo current earnings) for higher wages in the future. Although Bils and
Klenow find evidence that growth influences schooling decisions, they also reaffirm
previous studies that indicate that human capital accumulation encourages growth. By
calibrating the model to be consistent with microeconomic returns to education from
previous studies,1 the authors find that human capital accumulation spurs growth both
directly (through the labor force) and indirectly (through its interaction with
technological progress) and enters most significantly as a stock from the previous
generation. Thus, the positive relationship between education and growth is verified but
the direction of causality is still ambiguous, with evidence pointing to both channels.
A closely related issue to the relationship between education and growth is the
effect that schooling has on income inequality through redistribution. Eckstein & Zilcha
(1994), Keller (2006), Marin & Psacharopoulos (1976), and Benabou (2002) explore this
facet of the macroeconomic relationship and conclude that increased schooling
investment leads to decreased inequality. Keller (2006) uses panel data to regress lagged
education level variables on GINI coefficients from both developed and developing
1

Bils and Klenow use data and results from many previous studies, including Psacharopoulos 1985 and
UNESCO data from 1977 and 1983.
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nations and concludes that investment in secondary education serves to decrease the
income gap among countries. Marin and Psacharopoulos (1976) assess the effect of a
change in the level of schooling in a country on the variance in the log of earnings in
order to capture inequality effects. They conclude that, given U.S. data, one extra year of
schooling leads to a decrease in the variance of log earnings by 10 percent, effectively
reducing income inequality. Although this estimate may vary when particular rates of
return and school investment data are used for developing nations, Marin and
Psacharopoulos suggest that the positive link would still exist. Benabou (2002)
specifically examines two alternate policies aimed at redistributing income: educational
investment and taxes and transfers. Benabou determines that education finance produces
higher income growth than a tax or transfer program; if about two-thirds of the difference
in household education expenditures resulting from income disparities is offset (the upper
30 percent of the population subsidizing the bottom 70 percent through education
investment), there would be a 7.3 percent efficiency gain in the economy, with six
percent coming from increased aggregate income. Benabou concludes that
redistributional measures through education would thus effectively lead to income
growth. The issue of inequality as it relates to education is especially salient in Latin
America, thus more attention is given to this subject in the specific discussion of Mexico
in section 1.4.
Other macroeconomic studies focus on benefits from additional education other
than growth. Haveman and Wolfe (1984) construct willingness to pay estimates for
several non-market aspects of returns to education, including “improved citizenship” and
changed valuation of leisure time. The authors conclude that estimated values for non-
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market returns to schooling indicate an underreporting of total returns in most studies that
focus solely on private, easily measured benefits. Glewwe (2002) provides an example of
the correlation between education and desirable social outcomes, noting that a study in
South Africa by Duncan Thomas finds a strongly negative relationship between years of
schooling and a woman’s number of children. Similarly, the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) reports that basic education is socially desirable, because it
provides a foundation for future benefits such as improved health, lower birth rates, and
higher standards of living (ESPLA 1998). Thus, conventional returns likely
underestimate the true value of additional schooling.

1.4 The Case of Mexico
As mentioned previously, inequality is particularly pertinent to discussions of
growth and development in Latin America. GINI coefficients in Latin America range
between 43.4 (Venezuela) and 58.5 (Colombia) with Mexico falling in the middle at
48.1.2 While there are nations with higher levels of inequality (Comoros is highest at
64.3), Latin America is the only region where all countries report GINI coefficients
above 40. This inequality has a strong correlation with many other development tools and
outcomes. The link between inequality and education is especially strong, and thus the
discussion of education as a tool for growth and development in Latin America becomes
a discussion of inequality as well.
There has been some discussion of investment in education in Mexico over the
last several decades. Carnoy (1967) demonstrated that primary school investment was the
2

The numbers reported here reflect the average from 1992-2007 as compiled by the UNDP in its
Human Development Reports.
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most important for economic growth in Mexico at that time. Psacharopoulos (1996)
provides more recent results indicating that secondary schooling yields higher returns.
The more recent result hinges strongly on the fact that in the last three decades of the 20th
century, primary education in Mexico became virtually universal (Psacharopoulos 1996).
Most recently, the IDB reported that returns to secondary education in Mexico were 11
percent, lower than the 14 percent return to primary school (ESPLA 1998). These varying
results may be due in part to inequality. The IDB report notes that workers in rural areas
can earn up to 44 percent less than their counterparts in urban locations, suggesting that
returns to schooling may vary greatly between the two areas (ESPLA 1998). Rural
workers may benefit more from primary school education while urban workers may need
secondary schooling to increase their expected wages most significantly. Similarly, as
secondary schooling became more widespread in the last decade, there may have been a
crowding of workers with secondary education, thus reducing the returns to this
additional schooling in sectors with large populations of well-educated workers.
Despite the promising nature of many regional studies that focus on Latin
America, the same concerns discussed above apply to these countries; sample selection
concerns are especially problematic in countries where a large percentage of adults work
in the informal sector. Glewwe (2002) notes that of formal sector workers in developing
nations, a large percentage has government jobs that often have inflated, or artificially
determined, wages that fail to accurately reflect educational background and thus
underestimate the true returns to education. On the other hand, studies that only use wage
earners may overestimate earnings due to the lack of less-educated workers who work in
the informal sector and do not report earnings. Thus, especially in countries like Mexico
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where a large percentage of the population is employed in the informal or government
sectors, estimates of the true returns to education may lead to either over- or
underestimated values. The results from these studies are consequently unreliable if such
sample selection biases are not addressed.
In his discussion of Latin American education investment trends, Behrman (1985)
discusses two other potential omitted variable biases that are more prevalent in this
region than elsewhere. First, Behrman notes that a failure to control for exogenous
variables such as ability and family connections that may be associated with both
schooling and wages is a substantial obstacle in Latin America. Exogenous variables such
as indigenous background may play a strong part in both school access and wages, more
so in Latin America than in more equal regions; much of the inequality in the region
mirrors ethnic distributions, indicating that skin color and family background are
associated with access to opportunities for advancement, thus leading to a biased result.
Second, the “failure to control for geographical aggregation biases” (30) is a larger
problem in Latin America than in many other developing regions due to the extreme
inequality in capital availability among regions; as noted by Krueger and Lindahl (2001),
capital stocks must be taken into account. By failing to control for these differences in
physical capital availability among regions, results from empirical studies can easily
misrepresent true returns to investment; an average for physical capital accumulation in
an entire country would fail to capture the extreme differences in resources between poor
and rich states. Behrman finds that traditional estimates of returns to education are
significantly upwardly biased when controls such as those mentioned above are not used.
Aggregate results for Latin American countries can easily overestimate returns to
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education if controls for unequal access to other resources are not taken into account.
However, once Behrman controls for these potential biases, he still finds an average
return of about 11 percent in his study of Brazil. He notes that these returns are still
considerable, and likely do not capture the full value of the positive externalities that
education provides. Thus, the positive relationship is unambiguously present in Latin
American studies, but the value of the return varies based on the extent to which
inequality is controlled for in the studies.

1.5 Conclusions
A review of the literature linking education and growth indicates some strong
evidence that individuals as well as society benefit from investment in schooling. Higher
wages and reduced inequality are only two of the many potential benefits. Including
positive externalities that spillover into other facets of society, such as mortality rates and
crime, would further imply that investment in education is beneficial for a developing
nation. Despite results from some authors that suggest that education and growth are not
positively related on an aggregate level, the methods employed to reach these conclusions
have been refuted by more recent studies. The only conclusion that remains ambiguous is
the direction of causality between education and growth; there is evidence to support
causation from both directions.
Given the fact that education certainly yields private and social benefits,
investment in schooling should be desirable for both individuals and governments. Many
students, however, do not ever enroll in school or drop out early. In Mexico, the
secondary school enrollment rate for children age 13 to 15 is 82.5 percent, but the
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enrollment rate for all older children, 13 to 18, is only 68 percent. Thus, dropout rates are
high, especially compared with the secondary school enrollment rate of 88 percent for a
developed country such as the United States (World Bank Group 2010). There are many
factors that may influence these enrollment decisions in Mexico, including the potential
for employment in the United States and the associated educational requirements (or lack
thereof) for such jobs. There may also be measurable components of school costs, both
direct and indirect, that potentially outweigh the benefits and serve to deter enrollment for
these individuals.
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Chapter 2: The Cost of Education and its Relationship with Enrollment
Decisions for Mexican Households
It is well established that individuals receive a positive return to investing in their
own education; more schooling almost always translates into higher earning potential.
However, there are costs associated with investing in human capital accumulation rather
than working or enjoying leisure time. These costs vary widely among and within
countries and have not been thoroughly examined for many developing nations, including
Mexico. Beyond serving as an indication of the magnitude of schooling costs, however,
these measures may also inform a parent’s decision to enroll his/her child in school. With
universal primary and secondary education as one of Mexico’s goals, it is useful to
determine what the relationship is between a parent’s decision to enroll a child (increase
human capital) and the related costs.

2.1 Schooling Cost Theory
Many authors have discussed cost and expenditure components and their
relationship with quality and quantity of schooling. In all evaluations of costs, it is clear
that both public and private entities share the burden, and the degree to which each
party’s share affects schooling outcomes and decisions is central to policy
recommendations. While many authors make the distinction between public and private
costs, however, the specific definition of “private” varies widely in the field.
A substantial body of research defines “private costs” as those incurred by the
private sector, i.e. businesses and for-profit organizations (James 1994, Jimenez 1986,
World Bank 1986). When the private costs are defined in such a way, household demand
16

for education is taken as exogenous. An alternative definition of “private costs” is given
by some as costs incurred by the household (Verry 1987, Ilon & Moock 1991, Jacoby
1994, McEwan 1998), thus endogenizing the family’s schooling demand. There is strong
evidence to support the necessity of examining the demand side of education through the
costs it imposes on private families. A cursory review of empirical results presented by
Tsang (1994) reveals that the ratio of private (family) to public expenditures on education
is substantial and in some cases greater than one; for example, the ratios in Brazil and
Colombia are 1.11 and 0.51, respectively. In addition, the private costs in some instances
comprise a large percentage of household income; measurements for the poorest 20
percent of households in Thailand in 1987 indicate that direct schooling costs were 16.3
percent of household income. Given the fact that families clearly incur substantial costs
in many cases, a comprehensive cost analysis of education would require examination of
household private costs, not just the for-profit sector private costs. Despite this fact, most
of the literature takes household demand for schooling as exogenous (Jimenez 1986,
James 1994) or forgoes a comprehensive individual cost structure that includes
opportunity cost (Verry 1987).
In the small subset of work that does focus on household costs in an effort to
characterize demand for schooling, there is a clear distinction between direct school costs
(fees, books, uniforms, etc.) and opportunity costs (lost labor in family business,
babysitting, etc.). There is not, however, agreement on which cost component more
directly impacts schooling demand. Jacoby (1994) focuses on opportunity costs, ignoring
direct expenditures, in an effort to tie demand decisions to household borrowing
constraints in Peru. Using lifetime discounted utility for the household, Jacoby models
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attendance decisions and their relationship with siblings and other household resources.
He concludes that borrowing constraints lead to a full-time/part-time switching point, the
specific location of which is determined by comparative advantage calculations for all
children; human capital investment (attendance in school) is only worthwhile for children
who do not contribute as much to the family income.
In contrast, Ilon and Moock (1991) model attendance decisions using direct costs,
opportunity costs, and extensive vectors of household and school characteristics to
establish the relationship between private costs and demand for education in Peru. Their
findings indicate that of the opportunity cost components, only work on the family farm
significantly affects schooling decisions, while all of the direct costs have a great impact.
For instance, low-income households are up to 19 percent more likely to enroll their
children in school at an early age (between six and eight years old) if school fees and
other direct costs are equivalent to those in the 10th percentile of the sample rather than at
the actual average level. Similarly, girls from low-, middle-, and high-income households
are 18, seven, and one percent more likely, respectively, to stay in school if fees and other
direct costs are equal to those at the 50th percentile, compared with the actual higher
levels for these subgroups. Socioeconomic factors, such as mother’s education, also
exhibited significant effects on school attendance for children. For instance, compared
with the mother’s true level of education, her children are up to eight percent more likely
to ever be enrolled in school if she completes one additional year of schooling.
The combination of the Ilon & Moock and Jacoby studies indicates that both
opportunity costs and direct costs have the potential to influence schooling decisions.
Unfortunately, there are few other studies, especially within the last ten years, which
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examine specific household demand for education models; thus, there is a lack of
evidence to support or refute the findings from these authors. Furthermore, both of the
studies mentioned above focus only on Peru, with the Ilon and Moock study even more
restrictively focused on rural Peru.

2.2 Analytical Framework and Methodology
The goal of this analysis is to expand on the literature and determine what
components (such as household characteristics, community factors, and costs) affect a
parent’s decision to enroll a child in school. This decision is modeled by a combination of
a Mincerian human capital model (1974) and Becker’s household production model
(1981). Although the individual who accumulates the human capital and trades leisure
time for schooling hours is the child, I assume that parents or adult guardians make
enrollment decisions for their children, especially given that this sample defines children
as those under 16 years of age. Because a key component of Becker’s model is the
interdependence of utility functions, this specification fits well into the analytical
framework.
Mincer’s human capital model explains the relationship between schooling and
training and wages. The empirical model is as follows:
wage = f (HK) = αHK

(2)

where wage is expressed as a function of human capital (HK), and alpha is the return to
€
the human capital investment.
A more specific model proposed by Mincer describes the

functional form of this relationship:

ln(hourlywage) = α 0 + α1 experience + α 2 experience 2 + α 3 s + u

€
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(3)

where the log hourly wage is a function of a person’s experience on the job, experience
squared, and years of schooling (s). Both experience and years of schooling are expected
to have a positive relationship with wage. Because years of education thus contribute to
determining an individual’s wage, this model suggests that accumulating human capital
in the form of years of schooling leads to positive private returns. Because this thesis
seeks to explore human capital investment for children, I use a slightly altered model.
Children do not usually have work experience that would lead to higher wages, so I
substitute age for experience based on the assumption that an older child is stronger,
more mature, and thus more productive; age should be positively associated with wage,
just as experience was in equation (3) above. Thus, the basic human capital model for
children is as follows:

ln(hourlywage) = α 0 + α1age + α 2 age 2 + α 3 s + u

(4)

The other component of the analytical framework is Becker’s household
production€model, which establishes both the relationship between labor and other
household activities and the household decision-making process that leads to collectively
maximized utility. The theoretical model is as follows:
maxU = U(current consumption, futureconsumption)
s.t. px + wl = I

(5)

Households maximize collective utility in terms of current consumption and future
€
consumption,
subject to a budget constraint where the value of market goods (price (p)

times quantity (x) of all goods) plus the value of lost labor (wages (w) times leisure (l)
hours) must equal household income (I). The current consumption consists of time (both
for parents and children) and market goods, which can be combined in order to maximize
utility, but due to the budget constraint are not unlimited. The future consumption is the
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discounted value of market goods and time in a future period, similarly combined to
maximize utility within the constraints of a household’s income. This future consumption
itself is a function, in part, of the children’s ability to provide income in the future:
futureconsumption = f ( futureincome) = f (s)

(6)

where s is children’s years of schooling. The link between years of schooling and future
€ from the human capital model established in equation (4). Thus, any
income comes

maximization choices toward future consumption require, in part, that children receive
schooling in the current time period. The extent to which each household prefers current
consumption to future consumption (the household’s discount rate) will in part determine
how each household solves its maximization problem; households with lower discount
rates will have a smaller current to future consumption ratio than those households with
higher discount rates. Thus, low discount rate households may require that their children
obtain more education.
In this household production model, the standard utility maximization rule
applies, specifically that the ratio of marginal utility to price must be equalized across all
goods, both current and future:

MU x MU y
MU n
=
= ... =
Px
Py
Pn

(7)

Thus, if the price of one good increases, the household will necessarily consume less of

€ market goods, leisure time, and schooling all conform to the decision
it. Consumption of
models established in equations (2) through (7).
The specific component of the household production function that I will explore is
the decision to enroll a child in school. Thus, I use an empirical model where the
dependent variable of interest is a binary enrollment variable. Based on the other
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components in the household production model, and following Ilon and Moock (1991),
there are four categories of independent variables that comprise the decision model:
individual child and household characteristics, opportunity costs, school access, and
direct school costs. All of these variables affect the values in the utility maximization
problem as given in equation (5); for example, household income provides information
for the budget constraint while access to schools affects the price of education.
Based on the nature of the empirical question, I chose a probit model for the
analysis. Although other authors (such as Ilon & Moock) have used a logit framework,
Hahn and Soyer (2005) indicate that the differences between the probit and logit
outcomes in a univariate (dependent) analysis are minimal. Due to the prevalence of
probit models in household production and labor-related empirical work, I use the
following probit model:
p(enrolled) = β 0 + β1direct + β 2 transportation + β 3 X + β 4Y + β 5 Z + u

(8)

where p(enrolled) is the probability of enrollment, the betas are parameters, direct is the
€ school costs, transportation is the transportation cost to attend school, X is a vector
direct

of opportunity cost measures, Y is a vector of child and household characteristics, and Z
is a vector of school access variables. Based on the human capital and household
production models, we can predict the sign of the relationship between the dependent and
independent variables.
Direct costs relate to the price of schooling. Given the utility maximization rule in
equation (7), we know that if the price of a commodity increases, the amount consumed
will decrease. Thus, if direct costs increase, we expect consumption of schooling to
decrease, thus decreasing the probability that a child will enroll in school. We therefore
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expect a negative relationship between direct costs and the probability of enrollment.
Similarly for transportation costs, we expect a negative relationship to exist between
these costs and the probability of enrollment; as transportation costs increase, the quantity
of transportation to school that the household consumes should decrease, and thus the
probability of enrollment should decrease as well.
The opportunity cost variables represent other market and non-market goods that
a household can choose to consume instead of schooling. If a child works, he is less
likely to be enrolled in school because he has chosen to “consume” time working in the
current period rather than consuming education or material goods. Every hour spent
working is one hour that a child cannot be in school. Thus, we expect a negative
relationship between a child’s employment and enrollment in school. Similar
relationships should exist for the dummy variables that indicate if a household owns a
farm or a business. Work in a family business or in the household caring for other family
members uses time that could otherwise be used for school. The final measure of
opportunity cost, child’s wages, should also exhibit a negative relationship with the
probability of enrollment in school. Wages are essentially the price of time spent not
working (leisure, schooling, other household activities), as shown in equation (5); thus,
the higher the wage, the less non-work time the household will consume. As a child’s
wage increases, we expect the probability of enrollment to decrease.
Child and household characteristics inform a household’s preferences and thus
ultimate decisions when maximizing utility. Household income is represented in the
budget constraint in equation (5). As income increases, the household is able to consume
more of everything, including schooling. Thus, we expect a positive relationship between
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household income and the probability of enrollment. In order to determine the
relationship between a child’s age and his/her probability of enrollment, we begin with
equation (4). According to the model, an older child is more productive, and thus should
earn higher wages, all else equal. Given that age is positively related to wages, we then
refer to the explanation above concerning the association between a child’s wage and his
probability of enrollment. Using equation (5), we know that the wage is the price of nonwork time (such as school), and thus as the wage increases, the quantity of schooling
consumed must decrease according to the utility maximization rule. Thus, we expect a
child’s age and his probability of enrollment to be negatively related.
Mother’s and father’s education enter the model in a more indirect way. Higher
levels of parental education might indicate a preference for schooling that would manifest
in a higher level of marginal utility that the household derives from sending individuals to
school. Thus, higher parental education would lead to more consumption of education for
the children, leading to a greater probability of enrollment (a positive relationship).
Parental education could also enter the model through the discount rate. Investment in
human capital implies a willingness to defer current consumption in favor of higher
future consumption. Thus, if parents have chosen to invest in their own education, they
might have lower discount rates than parents who chose to discontinue their own
schooling early on. A lower discount rate implies a greater ratio of future to current
consumption; if this is true, households with lower discount rates would need to invest
more in children’s human capital investments in the current time period, as discussed in
equation (6). Thus, parents with higher education may have lower discount rates, thus
investing more in a child’s education in the present. This link suggests a positive
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relationship between parents’ education and a child’s probability of enrollment. The
relationship between a mother’s age and her child’s probability of enrollment follows a
similar explanation. An older mother may be more concerned about her child’s ability to
support her in old age, and thus prefer to invest more in her child’s human capital now in
favor of future consumption. An older mother may also serve as a proxy for the presence
of older siblings in the household. If more older siblings are present, then there are more
people who are likely to complete household chores or earn wages. Thus, the child’s
opportunity cost of attending school decreases. Both of these relationships suggest that a
mother’s age is positively related to her child’s probability of enrollment.
A child’s gender and indigenous background are two variables that may be
positively or negatively related to school enrollment. Since girls may earn lower wages
than boys due to discrimination, we would expect girls to have a higher probability of
being enrolled (given the relationship between wages and enrollment as discussed
earlier), and thus a positive relationship between girls and enrollment. However, lower
wages could also reduce future expected consumption (according to equation 6), reducing
the benefits from investing in human capital in the present. Thus, we would see a
negative relationship. Similarly ambiguous, indigenous populations could have either a
positive or negative relationship with enrollment. Because indigenous populations were
historically underserved in schooling access, they could be less likely to be enrolled;
however, the modern attempts to improve schooling for these populations and actively
increase school access may create a positive relationship between the two variables.
School access variables and a dummy variable for rural households are the final
variables in the model. We expect that the presence of schools in a community will be
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positively related to a child’s enrollment. The closer a school is to a child’s home, the
lower the costs of attending (transportation, time lost in transit); thus, as discussed earlier,
if the price of schooling decreases, the household will choose to consumer more of it.
Additionally, the presence of higher-level schools (above elementary level) may also
suggest a community or household preference for schooling, since households may
choose their location based on school availability. This preference would increase the
marginal utility that a household receives from consuming education, and thus we expect
the household to increase its consumption. Both of these explanations suggest a positive
relationship between access to schooling and enrollment. Conversely, we would expect
households in rural communities to experience higher costs of school attendance (farther
from schools), and thus have a negative relationship with enrollment.
Table 3 provides a list of the variables included in the empirical model (equation
8) along with their expected signs.
Table 3: Model components
Model component
direct
transportation
X (opportunity
cost)

Y (child and
household
characteristics)

Z (school access)

Variables included
Direct costs
Transportation costs
Child works
Wage
Owns farm
Owns business
Age
Female
Indigenous language
Household annual income
Mother’s education
Father’s education
Mother’s age
Rural location
Distance school in area
Jr high is highest school in area
High school is highest in area
University is highest in area
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Expected sign
?
?
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

2.3 Description of the Data
In order to evaluate individual-level schooling decisions, I use the Mexican
Family Life Survey from 2005. Constructed by the Mexican National Bureau of Statistics
(INEGI) in conjunction with researchers from the University of California Los Angeles,
the National Institute of Perinatology (INPER), the Center for Economic Investigation
and Teaching (CIDE), and the Universidad Iberoamericana (UIA), this nationally
representative survey contacted 8437 households in 295 communities. The collected
information ranges from household expenditures to individual health characteristics. In
addition, community data for infrastructure and price levels were also collected. The
survey is probabilistic, multi-staged, stratified by geographic and socioeconomic
characteristics, and clustered. INEGI’s sampling design ensured that accurate
representation at the national and regional level was possible, and thus researchers
oversampled rural populations. Because of this oversampling, I use household weights in
the characterization of direct costs in order to accurately represent the true population.3
The sample used in this analysis consists of households with children (defined
here as ages five to 16)4 that responded to the question “Is the child enrolled in school?”
This qualification yielded 7007 usable child records in the 295 community areas defined
in the survey. Of the 7007 child observations that had data for the enrollment question,
5395 also reported other household and child characteristics. Thus, the final sample used
here has 5395 children in 3027 households. Table 4 provides summary statistics detailing
the characteristics of the sample. The observations are distributed almost equally between
3

Sample weights for the 2005 data are not yet available. However, because the re-contact rate from the
2002 to 2005 surveys was close to 90%, the weights from each year are expected to be very similar. I
therefore use the 2002 household weights in this analysis.
4
Although the official enrollment age for primary school in Mexico is six, 85 percent of the 486 five-yearolds report being enrolled; thus, they were included in the sample. Compulsory education in Mexico
extends through the end of secondary school, roughly age 16 (ILAB 2010).
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girls and boys (51 percent female) with the average age about 9.7 years old. Slightly
more than one third of the sample lives in a rural area (35 percent), and the average
household annual income is about 55,500 pesos (US $5,073).5
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Name
Enrolled
Indigenous language

N
5395
5395

Mean
.951
.135

Std. Dev.
.217
.341

Min
0
0

1
1

4458
5395
5395

.959
.040
55550

.197
.196
61393

0
0
27

1
1
1008000

Mother’s highest level of education
in years
Father’s highest level of education in
years

5395

7.0

4.1

0

21

4310

7.2

4.4

0

19

Binary, father reported=1

5395

.688

.463

0

1

Age of child

5395
5395
5395
5395

9.7
.505
.350
1410

2.9
.500
.477
2664

5
0
0
56

15
1
1
23287

5395

.703
(2.02)

1.057
(2.9)

-.875
(.417)

5.704
(300)

5395

210

359

0

3737

Mother’s age
5395
36.3
Binary, family owns a farm=1
Owns farm
5395
.158
Binary, family owns a business=1
Owns business
5395
.114
Source: Mexican Family Life Survey 2005 and author’s calculations
*peso:dollar conversion rate for 2005 is 10.94:1

7.1
.365
.317

18
0
0

72
1
1

School type
Child works
Household annual
income
Mother’s education
Father’s education
(reported values only)
Father reported
education
Age
Female
Rural
Direct costs
Wage
Transportation costs

Description
Binary, enrolled=1
Binary, speaks indigenous language
at home=1
Public=1, Private=0
Binary, child employed=1
Household annual income, in pesos*

Binary, female=1
Binary, town of less than 2500=1
Direct school costs annually,
averaged by community, in pesos*
Child’s log hourly wage, averaged
by community and gender, in pesos*
(delogged values in parentheses)
Transportation costs per month,
averaged by community, in pesos*
Mother’s age, in years

Max

Direct Costs
The direct costs for schooling include money spent on fees, tuition, books,
materials, and uniforms during one school year; the survey asked respondents to report
the combined value of these costs for the previous school year. Of the 5395 children in
the sample, 5311 report direct costs; of these, about 562 report that direct costs were zero
even though the child was enrolled in school. Because the majority of children attend
public school (78 percent), it is not unlikely that families incur minimal costs for fees,
5

The peso to dollar conversion rate for 2005 was 10.94:1

28

tuition, and books. The maximum direct cost reported is 82,700 pesos for a student who
attends private school, and about 52,000 for a student in secondary public school.
These reported values should be taken as rough estimates, however, given the
discrepancy between the reporting date and the time in which the money was actually
spent. In his book discussing household surveys, Deaton (2000) warns that cost and
expenditure estimates tend to decline as more time passes between the payment date and
the survey date. While a longer timeframe more accurately represents an average
expenditure and avoids capturing anomalous data points, respondent recall becomes
weaker as the time period increases (25). Because the collection of direct cost
information in this survey referred to the previous school year, recalled estimates are
likely biased downward.
Table 5 more closely examines the distribution of reported direct costs (for
households with children who are enrolled) among different household and community
types.
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Table 5: Direct Annual Costs per Child (in pesos) for Households with Enrolled Children
(Standard deviations in parentheses)
Household with Primary Age
Students Only

Household with at least one
Secondary Age Student

None

782
(178)

779
(125)

Primary

1,007
(120)

1,581
(412)

Secondary

1,833
(214)

3,191
(774)

7,105
(1,344)

10,472
(4,021)

None

693
(103)

517
(64)

Primary

1,077
(157)

1,190
(185)

Secondary

1,719
(234)

1,856
(452)

Post-Secondary

4,010
(841)

10,170
(3,515)

Public

1,240
(108)

2,062
(412)

Private

13,020
(2,204)

13,533
(3,741)

No

2,171
(218)

2,635
(480)

Yes

3,747
(2,678)

2,530
(1,298)

Large City (>100,000)

2,618
(379)

3,218
(826)

Small City (15,000-100,000)

1,382
(294)

3,558
(2,302)

Town (2,500-15,000)

2,717
(849)

4,663
(1,888)

Rural (<2,500)

1,801
(233)

1,276
(147)

Mother’s Schooling

Post-Secondary

Father’s Schooling

Type of School

Child is employed

Area
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Table 5 (cont’d)
Household with Primary Age
Students Only

Household with at least one
Secondary Age Student

Low

1,111
(256)

867
(135)

Middle

1,718
(297)

1,626
(428)

High

3,831
(636)

5,019
(1,327)

Northern

2,474
(453)

2,138
(409)

Central

1,857
(257)

2,331
(559)

Southern

2,987
(654)

3,782
(1,296)

No

2,307
(245)

2,585
(492)

Yes

1,538
(537)

2,836
(1,123)

Female

2,442
(361)

2,282
(531)

Male

1,975
(258)

2,996
(741)

Household Annual Income

Region

Indigenous Language at Home

Gender

N (households)
1871
1102
Source: Author’s calculations using MXFLS 2005 data, household sample weights used
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There are several clear patterns in this data. Private schooling is more than ten
times as expensive as public schooling, and there is no great difference between the cost
of primary and secondary school of either type. Students in rural areas seem to pay at
least 2000 pesos (about $200) less for secondary schooling than their peers in larger
towns and cities. Given that the overall mean of these averaged direct costs is about 1700
pesos, this decrease in costs for the rural areas seems to be significant. As we would
expect, higher income households (over 63,000 pesos a year)6 spend more than three
times as much on schooling as do low income households (those below the average of
Mexico’s four minimum wages of about 17,000 a year), while there is not much
difference in schooling costs between low- and middle-income families. This jump in
spending by higher income households may be due to a higher prevalence of private
school attendance (seven percent of high income children attend private school compared
with four percent in the general sample).
Interestingly, families pay more for primary school if their children also work.
This fact may be due to the extra income that households have from children’s wages, but
we more often observe that households where children work are lower income and thus
would not use “extra” wages to pay for schooling, rather for food, shelter, etc. In this
sample, low-income households have the highest percentage of children who work (6.14
percent) compared to middle- and high-income families (with 3.37 and 4.12 percent of
children working, respectively). Because children who work are not more likely than

6

The average wage in Mexico for 2008 (the 2005 data was not available) was about 62,700 pesos. The
average of Mexico’s four minimum wages in 2008 was about 16,900 pesos (Mexico Facts). I therefore
chose to divide the income categories roughly along these boundaries. In the given sample, 15.88 percent of
households are “Low Income,” 54.63 percent are “Middle Income,” and 29.48 percent are “High Income.”
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average to attend private school (about four percent do, the same as the general sample),
we cannot attribute these higher costs to private school fees and tuition.
The final categories of the direct cost analysis that are noteworthy are parents’
education. There is a clear pattern that indicates that more educated parents spend more
on their child’s education. Much of this increase in costs stems from a dramatic jump in
the number of students who attend private school (15 percent) if at least one parent has
attended college; only two percent of students without at least one college-educated
parent attend private school. These cost measures are one way to see the intergenerational
transfer of educational standards; less than one percent of students who have at least one
college-educated parent are not enrolled in school, and this high attendance rate is
reflected in the higher costs that these families are willing to pay to send their children to
school.
In general, these household direct schooling costs are small compared to public
expenditure on education. In 2005, public expenditure per primary school student was 14
percent of GDP per capita, or about 11,405 pesos; public expenditure per secondary
school student was a bit higher at 15 percent of per capita GDP, or about 12,220 pesos
(World Bank Group 2010).7 With the exception of parents who have a college education
and private school students, none of the households spend more than about 38 percent of
the public expenditure. Recalling work by Tsang (1994), a ratio of private (household) to
public expenditure on students of 0.38 is not high compared with other Latin American
countries; Brazil and Colombia have ratios of 1.11 and 0.51, respectively. The average
(weighted) household income for this sample of students is 58,432 pesos while the
7

According to the CIA World Factbook, GDP per capita for Mexico in 2005 was US $7,446.86. The 2005
peso:dollar exchange rate was 10.94:1, thus GDP per capita in pesos for 2005 was 81,468. 14 and 15
percent of this total is 11,405 and 12,220, respectively.
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average (weighted) direct cost per student is 1,731 pesos. Thus, direct costs per student
are, on average, three percent of household income, an estimate lower than most reported
in other developing countries (Tsang 1994).
In order to use these direct costs as an independent variable in the model, we need
to create a proxy for direct costs for those children who are not attending school in order
to avoid a perfect correlation between not being enrolled and having zero direct costs.
(Children who do not attend school do not have direct costs by definition.) The proxy
direct costs variable should control for as many community characteristics as possible in
order to accurately predict what the value would be if the child were enrolled. Thus, I
created a variable that is the average of direct costs in the child’s community (as defined
by the community identifier in the survey). In this way, each community now has a direct
cost per child measure that is an average of the reported values from member households.
Because most households did report direct costs, the predicted values for the missing
observations are expected to be good approximations. The average values also serve to
temper outliers, as can be seen from Table 4 where the maximum value of the average
direct costs has dropped to 23,000 from the 82,700 maximum reported.
Opportunity Cost
The primary activity choices for a child in Mexico are to attend school or to work,
either at home or in a market setting; 216 children (four percent of the sample) report
being employed in the last 12 months, and 182 of these also attend school.8 Although a
child’s employment status may be a fair predictor of whether or not that child is enrolled
in school, the variable itself does not act as a good measure of opportunity cost, because
8

The legal employment age in Mexico is 14, with special provisions for workers under 16 (ILAB 2010). In
this sample, however, 156 of the 216 working children are under the age of 14.
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the two are highly correlated due to time constraints; because there are a limited number
of hours in the day, a choice to work automatically decreases the number of hours
available for school, and vice versa. Thus, using the simple binary child employment
variable to fully embody the opportunity cost only captures this time allocation portion.
In order to sufficiently capture the opportunity cost of enrolling in school, other variables
are necessary.
The best measure of opportunity cost for adults attending college, for example, is
the wage that could be earned outside of school. The obstacle to using wages for children
is the fact that only four percent of these students are working; thus, 96 percent of the
sample population does not have a reported wage. A common way to overcome missing
data is to impute the missing values. In doing so, however, the results may be biased due
to sample selection. The four percent of students who are working may choose to do so
because their wages are high enough to offset the lost leisure time. Conversely, those
children who work may be from liquidity constrained, poorer households and
consequently may be less productive at work (due to poorer nutrition, perhaps) and
receive lower than average wages. Thus, simply using the wages of the employed
students as a guideline for every student’s wage could over- or underestimate the true
wages for the sample. The solution to this potential selection bias problem is to use the
Heckman model (1979) to impute the missing values.
In constructing imputed wages for these students, a basic human capital model
based on Mincer’s 1974 model is used for the first-stage wage equation. As discussed
earlier, the basic model is altered to substitute age for experience, given the fact that
children likely do not have work-related training that affects wages. The resulting human
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capital model for children is based on equation (4), with the addition of two control
variables for gender and rural location:
(9)

ln(hourlywage) = α 0 + α1age + α 2 age 2 + α 3 s + α 4 female + α 5 rural + u

where ln(hourly wage) is the log of the hourly wage reported by children who work, the

€

alphas are parameters, s is years of schooling, and age, female, and rural are child
characteristics as defined in Table 4.
The second-stage selection equation must include a variable that likely predicts
whether or not a child is employed (in order to correct for the sample selection bias) but
does not predict the child’s wage. In a similar computation, Binder and Scrogin (1999)
find that mother’s employment status serves as a viable selection variable for imputing a
child’s wage. Because this variable is not readily available in the sample, mother’s
education was tested as a possible alternate choice for a selection variable. The result is
that mother’s education did predict whether her child was employed but did not have a
statistically significant influence on her child’s wage.9 Thus, the second-stage selection
equation included mother’s education as the selection variable.
The resulting model is as follows:

predicted wage = α 0 + α1age + α 2 age 2 + α 3 s + α 4 female + α 5 rural + λ + u

(10)

where predictedwage is the imputed wage, the alphas are parameters, s is years of

€

schooling, age, female, and rural are child characteristics as reported in Table 4, and the
lambda term is the calculated value from the Heckman equations.

9

Mother’s education was statistically significant and negatively correlated with her child’s employment
status (marginal effects coefficient estimate: -.002, standard error: .0007). On the other hand, mother’s
education was not statistically significant in her child’s wage equation but the coefficient was still negative
(coefficient estimate: -.041, SE: .030)
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The results from running the Heckman two-stage procedure indicate that the
model does not perform well. While the variables in the selection equation were
significant, the resulting imputed wage model only produces one significant variable,
gender. In other words, the created model will not accurately predict a child’s wage. The
most likely explanation for this outcome is that a child’s wage may be highly variable
and not depend on the standard components of a human capital model. Using the
observations from children who do report a wage, I run the human capital model from
equation (9) in order to determine if children’s wages follow the same theoretical pattern
that Mincer suggested. The result is presented in Table 6; only the dummy variable for
rural community is significant and years of education and age have signs opposite those
we would expect. This result strongly suggests that children’s wages in our sample do not
closely follow the standard human capital model and thus cannot be imputed using such a
framework.
Table 6: OLS estimates for Children’s Wages
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Variable
Coefficient

Age

-.0302
(.0579)
-.3508
(.4964)

Age^2

.0284
(.0216)

Rural community

.5721**
(.1921)

Female

.3267
(.2090)

Years of education

Note: Sample is based on those children who directly report wages; n=139
** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In order to establish some kind of wage measure, we can use the community
information for each child rather than an imputed wage. Because wages are likely to vary
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among communities based on local factors, we can create an average children’s wage for
each community. In addition, we separately find the mean wage for girls and boys in each
community. Thus, the wage variable used in the final models is an average of community
wages by gender. Using this wage allows us to model what we expect to be a significant
opportunity cost for attending school while also acknowledging the extreme variability of
children’s wages in the sample.
Due to the uncertainty surrounding wage measurements, it is important to include
other variables that capture opportunity cost as well. Although only four percent of the
children in the sample report being employed, there may be many more children who
work at home for their relatives on a family farm or in a family business. These children
likely wouldn’t report employment, much less report a wage; however, working for a
relative may directly influence a family’s decision to send a child to school. In order to
capture this potential opportunity cost, we can use information about family ownership of
a farm or business. Thus, I include two dummy variables (for owning a farm and owning
a business) as additional measures of opportunity cost.
Another opportunity cost measure that is supported in the literature (Jacoby 1994,
Ilon & Moock 1991) is the number of siblings and birth order. Unfortunately, the
available data did not include this information for much of the sample. Instead, mother’s
age is used as a related measure to birth order and number of siblings. An older mother is
used as a proxy for there being older children in the household, a situation that might
reduce the opportunity cost for the observed child. Mother’s age was constructed by first
matching each child with his/her mother and then including the woman’s age information
from the adult files.
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Transportation Costs
Survey respondents reported the cost of transportation one-way to school for the
previous month. Just as with the direct costs, a community average is used in the
empirical analysis in order to account for the lack of transportation costs for those
children not enrolled.

Child and Household Characteristics
The data for age and female come directly from household roster questions asked
by the interviewer and are given for each child in the household under 16 years of age.
Rural location was created using the size of the household’s town or city; rural locations
are classified by the survey developers as those with fewer than 2500 inhabitants.
Respondents were also asked to indicate whether or not the child spoke an indigenous
language at home, providing data for the indigenous language variable. Household
annual income was created by summing the reported annual income for all adults in the
household; the reported incomes include wages earned from market-based employment
and from self-employment. Mother’s education and father’s education were created by
first matching each child with his/her mother and father in the data set and then including
the survey respondent’s answer to the question “what is the highest level of schooling
that this (adult) individual has achieved?” While mother’s education comes directly from
these reported values, the father’s variable required more manipulation. Because the
response rate for father’s education was low (only 4310 out of the 5395), I created two
variables in order to keep the integrity of the entire sample. Father’s response is a
dummy variable that indicates whether or not the father’s education is reported, and
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father’s education is an interaction variable equal to the binary response variable times
the reported education. This way, father’s education has observations for the entire
sample of 5395, but we are still able to distinguish between those fathers who truly
reported zero years of education and those who simply did not answer the question.

School Access Variables
All five school access variables come from the community files in the survey. For
each of the 295 communities, an administrator or other official responded to questions
regarding local infrastructure and prices. The five school access variables indicate
responses to the question, “Is there a (elementary/jr.high/high/university/distance school)
in the area?” Because 95 percent of communities have an elementary school,10 I created a
dummy variable indicating the highest-level school in the area; thus, jrhigh, high, and
university take the value of “1” if the community does not have any higher-level schools.
Therefore, elementary schools are taken as the base category in the dummy variable
analysis. Distance schools are left as a unique variable.

2.4 Empirical Results
I ran three specifications of the model presented above in equation (8), with
standard errors calculated for clustering by household. Table 7 presents the marginal
effects results. All three models include direct and transportation costs, while Models 2
and 3 add subsequently more detailed information about child characteristics and
community variables indicating access to schooling.
10

The distribution of elementary schools is not correlated with a child’s enrollment; 95.05 percent of
children who are enrolled have an elementary school in their area, while 94.97 percent of those who are not
enrolled have an elementary school presence.
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Table 7: Probit Estimates, Marginal Effects
(Robust standard errors in parentheses)
VARIABLES
Direct costs/1000
Transportation costs/1000
Child works
Female
Age
Age squared
Rural
Mother’s education
Wage

(1)
Model 1

(2)
Model 2

(3)
Model 3

-.0016**
(.0009)
-.0083
(.0096)
-.0712**
(.0203)
.0110**
(.0042)
.0698**
(.0058)
-.0036**
(.0003)
.0051
(.0047)
.0050**
(.0007)
.0028
(.0021)

-.0016**
(.0008)
-.0083
(.0088)
-.0670**
(.0194)
.0116**
(.0040)
.0655**
(.0056)
-.0034**
(.0003)
.0050
(.0044)
.0039**
(.0008)
.0026
(.0020)
-.0121**
(.0062)
.0033**
(.0008)
.0004
(.0003)
-.0016
(.0056)
.0077
(.0057)
.0068
(.0056)
-.0001
(.0005)

-.0021**
(.0008)
-.0086
(.0087)
-.0665**
(.0191)
.0119**
(.0040)
.0649**
(.0055)
-.0033**
(.0003)
.0052
(.0043)
.0038**
(.0008)
.0023
(.0019)
-.0115*
(.0061)
.0031**
(.0008)
.0004
(.0003)
-.0023
(.0057)
.0082
(.0055)
.0079
(.0054)
-.0001
(.0005)
.0029
(.0047)
.0080
(.0060)
.0097*
(.0053)
.0110*
(.0057)

Father reported schooling
Father’s education
Mother’s age
Owns farm
Owns business
Indigenous language
Household annual income/1000
Distance school in area
Jr. high is highest school in area
High school is highest school
University is highest school
Observations

5395
5395
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(Standard errors calculated for clustering by household)
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5395

In all three models, direct costs are highly significant. Economically speaking, if
direct costs increase by about $100 (1094 pesos), then the probability of a child being
enrolled declines by between 0.16 and 0.20 percentage points; if direct costs increase by
one standard deviation (2664 pesos, or about $243), the probability of enrollment
decreases by about 0.48 percentage points. While not a large effect, direct costs are
systematically related to schooling choices.
Of the individual child characteristics, gender, age, and parents’ education are the
most significant. Consistent with the examination of direct costs made earlier, for every
extra year of education a parent has, the probability of his/her child being enrolled in
school increases by about 0.4 percentage points. A mother with additional education
equivalent to one standard deviation (about four years) has an increased probability that
her child is enrolled of about 1.3 percentage points. Interestingly, age has a sign opposite
what we expect, indicating that older children are more likely to be enrolled. However,
the highly significant age squared variable indicates an inverted-U shaped relationship
between age and enrollment. In this sample, enrollment increases up to age 9.74 and then
begins to decline; the positive portion of the relationship must be stronger than the
negative to drive the coefficient on the age variable. The dummy variable for female has
a statistically significant and positive coefficient, indicating that girls are about one
percentage point more likely to be enrolled than boys. As discussed in section 2.2, the
relationship between gender and enrollment was theoretically ambiguous; the empirical
results reveal that in this sample, the positive relationship is stronger, although girls do
not receive statistically significantly lower wages than boys, as postulated earlier.
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Of the opportunity cost measures, only the dummy variable indicating whether or
not the child was employed is significant; if a child works, his/her probability of
enrollment decreases by about seven percentage points. This result is economically large
and to be expected, since the choice between working and going to school is a time
allocation decision; a child who works automatically has less time to attend school.
Furthermore, this result may also help to explain why secondary school enrollment is
lower than primary school enrollment (86 and 95 percent, respectively). Of children who
are secondary-school age (13-15), 9.67 percent work; only 2.49 percent of younger
children are employed.
Although not directly an opportunity cost variable, whether or not the father
reported years of schooling is also significant and may serve as an opportunity cost
measure. If a father reported schooling, his child is about one percentage point less likely
to be enrolled than a child whose father did not report schooling. A possible explanation
for this relationship is that a lack of father response indicates the father’s absence during
the interview, possibly due to employment. On the other hand, a father who did respond
to the schooling question may have been home during the interview rather than at work.
If a father does not work, then the children may have to work instead to contribute to the
family income. Because the correlation coefficient between the father’s response and the
child’s employment is -0.034, it does not seem to be the case that children work in the
market in place of their fathers. However, children may stay home with younger siblings
while their mothers work in the father’s stead, thus leading to lower enrollment
probabilities for these children.
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Finally, access to higher levels of education in the community is statistically
significant at the five percent level. Compared with children who only have elementary
schools in their communities, children with high schools are 0.97 percentage points more
likely to be enrolled in school, while children with universities in their communities are
1.1 percentage points more likely to enroll.
I also ran four subgroup specifications in order to examine segments of the
sample that may behave differently. For instance, because 95 percent of all children are
enrolled, examining the entire sample may not yield meaningful information in regards to
enrollment deterrents. Rather, examining only secondary school students (86 percent of
which are enrolled) could lead to clearer results. In addition, subgroups using just public
school children and just girls could provide a different perspective. Table 8 reports the
results from these subgroup specifications.
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Table 8: Subgroup Probit Estimates, Marginal Effects
(Robust standard errors in parentheses)
VARIABLES
Direct costs/1000
Transportation costs/1000
Child works
Female
Age
Age squared
Rural
Mother’s education
Wage
Father reported schooling
Father’s education
Mother’s age
Owns farm
Owns business
Indigenous language
Household annual income/1000
Distance school in area
Jr. high is highest school in area
High school is highest school
University is highest school
Observations

(1)

(2)

(3)

Secondary

Public

Girls

(4)
Secondary
Girls

-.0059**
(.0018)
.0098
(.0178)
-.0932**
(.0275)
.0188**
(.0094)
-.1340
(.1800)
.0041
(.0069)
.0126
(.0100)
.0054**
(.0016)
.0036
(.0041)
-.0184
(.0135)
.0044**
(.0017)
.0007
(.0008)
-.0181
(.0151)
.0093
(.0140)
.0140
(.0110)
.0000
(.0011)
.0213*
(.0110)
.0280**
(.0109)
.0239**
(.0106)
.0332**
(.0116)

-.0022**
(.0008)
-.0092
(.0093)
-.0710**
(.0203)
.0127**
(.0042)
.0681**
(.0057)
-.0035**
(.0003)
.0053
(.0046)
.0039**
(.0008)
.0025
(.0020)
-.0122*
(.0064)
.0033**
(.0008)
.0004
(.0003)
-.0024
(.0060)
.0086
(.0059)
.0084
(.0058)
-.0002
(.0006)
.0031
(.0050)
.0087
(.0062)
.0105*
(.0056)
.0114*
(.0056)

-.0018**
(.0007)
-.0052
(.0075)
-.0348
(.0237)

-.0055**
(.0018)
-.0044
(.0148)
-.0316
(.0325)

.0537**
(.0070)
-.0028**
(.0004)
.0025
(.0047)
.0022**
(.0008)
.0013
(.0021)
-.0149**
(.0058)
.0039**
(.0009)
.0006
(.0003)
-.0020
(.0071)
.0070
(.0065)
.0110**
(.0046)
-.0002
(.0005)
.0029
(.0051)
.0064
(.0060)
.0152**
(.0046)
.0121**
(.0056)

-.4810**
(.2450)
.0174*
(.0093)
.0031
(.0124)
.0019
(.0019)
.0059
(.0053)
-.0168
(.0158)
.0049**
(.0021)
.0016
(.0010)
-.0278
(.0215)
.0017
(.0196)
.0155
(.0120)
-.0013
(.0008)
.0099
(.0137)
.0285**
(.0110)
.0318**
(.0096)
.0475**
(.0136)

1754
5214
2727
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(Standard errors calculated for clustering by household)
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871

Regardless of the model restrictions, direct costs are statistically significant. In
smaller samples, an increase in direct costs of one standard deviation leads to a decrease
in the chance of enrollment by more than for the entire sample. The model restricted to
secondary-age students reports that an increase in direct costs of one standard deviation
leads to a decrease in the probability of enrollment of 1.57 percentage points; compared
with a decrease of 0.53 percentage points in the full sample, the restricted model effect is
much larger. Thus, secondary-age students are more sensitive to direct costs when
making enrollment decisions. In general, we see that the same child, household, and
community variables are significant. The child employment variable, however, is no
longer significant for the subgroup of girls. This result is consistent with the
characteristics of working children; 2.97 percent of girls work compared with 5.06
percent of boys. Two variables of note in the subgroup estimates are mother’s education
and age. Given secondary-age girls, father’s education is still statistically significant, but
mother’s education loses its statistical significance. Age, on the other hand, is still
statistically significant, but now has a negative sign. This result indicates that older
students start exhibiting the behavior that we expect, with younger children being more
likely to enroll. This result confirms that the turning point in the inverted-U relationship,
previously calculated at 9.74 years, is somewhere before age 13.

2.5 Conclusions
Based on a household production model that maximizes collective utility by
combining current and future consumption, I suggest that a child’s probability of being
enrolled in school is dependent on several components, including socioeconomic and
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individual characteristics, the direct costs of schooling, and opportunity costs. Because
direct schooling costs, such as materials and fees, are most easily altered by the
community or government, the first goal of this thesis was to examine the distribution
and characteristics of current direct costs in Mexico since no comparable examination
currently exists.
The direct cost analysis suggests that Mexican households do not pay a large
percentage of their income on school fees, uniforms, etc. At about three percent of the
average annual household income, Mexican families pay less than many other developing
nations. Similarly, the ratio of household to public schooling expenditures in relatively
low, at about 0.38. Other Latin American countries, such as Brazil, have ratios greater
than one. While these families in general do not spend great amounts on direct schooling
costs, there are some subgroups that tend to have much higher costs. Private school
students and those with college-educated parents spend up to ten times more on direct
costs than their counterparts. While these categories do overlap some, the results indicate
that households are willing to pay for higher levels of high quality education. Lastly, it
appears that the direct costs for secondary education are not systematically larger than
those for primary; this result is important for policies that aim to increase secondary
school enrollment.
Although the direct cost analysis indicates that Mexican households do not spend
more than other Latin American countries on schooling, these costs may still be a
deterrent to enrollment. In order to determine which components were most likely to
influence an enrollment decision, I created a probit model that included measures of
opportunity cost, household characteristics, and direct costs. The results of the probit
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regressions indicate that while small, direct costs play a role in determining whether or
not a child is enrolled in school; this result is consistent with previous studies such as Ilon
and Moock (1991). Given the relatively small size of these direct costs, it is somewhat
surprising that such a consistent relationship exists. It is clear that households include
direct cost measures in their household production functions and make enrollment
decisions with such costs in mind, but it is unfortunately beyond the scope of this data set
to determine what specific components of direct costs (materials, books, fees, uniforms,
etc.) have the most impact. Despite this fact, policies that aim to decrease any kind of
direct costs will have a small, but consistent, impact on school enrollment decisions.
Several other variables were also statistically and economically significant. The
positive relationship between parents’ education and their children’s enrollment is
consistent with previous findings and the theoretical prediction based on the household
production function. This finding also supports the macroeconomic literature that
suggests that schooling has intergenerational effects. On average, an extra year of
parents’ schooling increases that probability that their child will be enrolled by about 0.4
percentage points. While both father’s and mother’s education are statistically significant
for the entire sample, only father’s schooling retains its significance for girls age 13 to
15. This subgroup of girls also exhibits a negative relationship between age and
enrollment and a lack of significance for the employment dummy variable. There may be
other measures of opportunity cost not included in this analysis that influence enrollment
decisions for the subgroup of older girls.
In this analysis, quantitative measures of opportunity cost do not provide
statistically significant information in regards to enrollment decisions. As mentioned
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earlier, there are several additional measures of opportunity cost that should be included
in future analyses should the data become available, such as birth order. This analysis did
find, however, that children who are employed are much less likely to be enrolled in
school. Although this result is to be expected, the magnitude of the enrollment difference
(about seven percent) is great enough to warrant policy consideration. If universal
primary and secondary enrollment is a policy goal, then these results suggest that limiting
child employment would aid in attaining that goal.
Finally, the presence of schools in the household’s community has a statistically
significant impact on enrollment decisions. Children with universities in their
communities are one percent more likely to enroll in school than children with only an
elementary school. While this result isn’t as economically significant as the child
employment variable, it does suggest that public investment in education (as
demonstrated by the construction of and support for higher-level schools) has a positive
impact on a household’s schooling choices. In other words, the supply of and demand for
education appear to affect one another. While this connection is most likely due to
decreased transportation and attendance costs for the household, some of the relationship
may be due to a stronger community preference for education.
Based on the results of this analysis, it appears that parental education, child
employment, direct costs, and school access are the most consistently important
components of a household’s decision to enroll a child in school. Thus, future policies
should focus on lowering direct costs and increasing community support for education in
order to reach the goal of universal primary and secondary education for Mexican
children.
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Chapter 3: Mexico’s Free Textbook Program
In this chapter, I evaluate Mexico’s National Commission for Free Textbooks
(CONALITEG) program. CONALITEG produces and distributes textbooks for primary,
secondary, vocational, and post-secondary school students. It is clear that the
CONALITEG program aims to increase human capital accumulation through an indirect
route: alleviating costs to students. Rather than subsidizing enrollment itself (as the
Progresa program does, for example), CONALITEG removes one component of direct
costs that households would otherwise pay: textbook costs. Because direct costs proved
to be a significant factor in household enrollment decisions for children, this approach
may serve to increase enrollment. If enrollment increases and investment in human
capital expands, then there is strong evidence that Mexico will experience economic
growth, a reduction in inequality, or any number of positive externalities such as were
described earlier in the literature. Given this context, it seems that the Mexican
government has chosen a prudent channel for its investment in education. A common
economic tool used to systematically evaluate a program’s effects is a cost-benefit
analysis (CBA). Based on the evidence provided thus far, we expect the CONALITEG
program to pass this analysis, indicating that the effort is a good (in this case meaning
strictly that it provides more economic benefits than costs) use of government funds.

3.1 The Program
CONALITEG was started in Mexico in 1959 by the Mexican federal government
in order to serve primary and secondary students in all 31 states and the Federal District,
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Mexico City. The program distributes textbooks to regional warehouses, which then
distribute the materials to individual schools. The CONALITEG program serves as the
only textbook distributor in Mexico that is officially sanctioned by the Secretary of
Education. While the program produces a small number of books in two warehouses, the
majority of textbooks are purchased from independent and well-established publishers,
cutting down on the costs that CONALITEG would incur by producing large quantities
of books in-house; CONALITEG has deals with over 20 publishers, all but one with
offices in Mexico.
Because CONALITEG is a federally funded program, it is subject to reviews by
the Secretary of Education. Its last official review in 2009 resulted in stellar ratings in
categories ranging from “completion of goals” to “organizational structure.” However,
the external reviews of CONALITEG do not view the program from an economic costbenefit analysis perspective. Rather, the reviews are more normative in nature. In order to
determine whether or not the program is a good use of federal money, I will examine its
associated costs and benefits from a purely economic perspective. It is important to note,
however, that non-economic considerations clearly hold weight in the Mexican
government’s analysis of the program, so any conclusions reached in this discussion may
not reflect the government’s opinion of CONALITEG’s benefits.

3.2 Theoretical Overview
Before beginning the analysis of costs and benefits associated with the
CONALITEG program, it is necessary to discuss whether there is any support for the
theory that there are benefits directly attributable to the program. The driving force
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behind the CONALITEG project is the belief that providing textbooks to students will
enhance their education. Many components of a student’s educational experience are tied
to materials and infrastructure; however, it is often hard to quantify the exact impact that
materials have on educational outcomes. Therefore, a cost-benefit analysis of the
CONALITEG program makes a strong assumption that textbooks are actually tied to
improved educational outcomes and future earnings. There is empirical evidence for and
against this assumed connection between textbooks and student outcomes.
In his work on student attendance in Peru, Jacoby (1994) used textbook provision
as one of the determinants of school progress. While other components of school costs
seem to have a larger impact on attendance decisions, textbooks are still statistically
significant. Jacoby finds that students who have textbooks provided by the school and/or
government are 20 percent more likely to progress to the next grade. If we consider that
school progression is an integral part of school success, the results of Jacoby’s study
suggest that textbooks help students finish school. If they are more likely to finish school,
then their expected future earnings are higher than they would be without the textbooks.
However, not all studies agree with Jacoby’s findings.
In the study by Ilon and Moock (1991) using data from rural Peru, “school
quality” variables, such as the provision of textbooks, were not significant factors in
students’ school attendance decisions. Other elements of household costs, such as the
opportunity cost of students who would have otherwise worked in the family home or
business, were the significant determinants of school attendance. While this conclusion
contradicts that of Jacoby’s study, the difference in sample characteristics might account
for some of the disparity. Because Ilon and Moock only used rural households, the
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importance of transportation, materials, and opportunity costs may vary greatly from the
combined urban and rural sample used by Jacoby.
To further complicate the discussion of the link between textbook provision and
student success, a study in Honduras by Bedi and Marshall (1999) indicates that
textbooks may have a negative effect on student test scores, contradicting the findings by
Lockheed, Vail, and Fuller (1986) that conclude textbooks in Thailand increase test
scores as much as an additional 1.6 months of schooling would. The difference in results
may be due to variations in textbook use. Lockheed et. al find that one use of textbooks is
as a substitute for teacher education; thus, if a classroom has textbooks in order to
compensate for low teacher education, then a negative relationship may exist between
books and student achievement that captures the lack of teacher training. The study in
Thailand thoroughly interviewed teachers and their backgrounds as well as use of the
books, while the Honduras study did not; thus, the Thailand findings may better separate
the effect of the textbooks from those of teacher education. In a related study, Heyneman,
Jamison, and Montenegro (1984) use an intervention analysis of the government textbook
program in the Philippines in 1977 to find that textbooks are most efficient in improving
academic performance for students from more impoverished backgrounds relative to their
peers. These results are all based on standardized test scores rather than attendance,
however, so a direct comparison between this study and those previously discussed may
be invalid. It is clear from these studies that the link between textbook provision and
student outcomes may depend on the context.
One possible reason for the varied effects is that provision of textbooks does not
necessarily lead to proper use of the materials. Most of the studies mentioned thus far, as
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well as the CONALITEG literature itself, only examine whether the presence of
textbooks has an effect on outcomes. It is clear, however, that textbooks sitting on a shelf
in the classroom might not have a measurable impact on student success. Therefore, some
of the studies that find no effect on outcomes due to textbooks may be capturing the lack
of proper textbook use in the classroom. On the other hand, studies that show a positive
impact from textbooks (Lockheed et.al. 1986, for example) may have captured the full
potential of a teacher’s effective use of the materials. It is impossible to know whether or
not teachers are properly using the textbooks in studies without teacher surveys, but
future data collection and reviews would benefit from including such information.
In order to acknowledge the different conclusions regarding textbook
effectiveness, the benefits calculation will include two different probability increases for
progress to the next school year, 20 percent and one percent, which will serve as upper
and lower bounds for the true benefits. The 20 percent probability increase comes from
the results in Jacoby’s 1994 study in Peru; he concluded that the provision of textbooks
decreased the chance that a student would drop out or repeat a grade by 20 percent. If a
student did not enroll in a higher grade the following year, it would be because he/she
dropped out or repeated the lower grade. Thus, by reducing the chance that a student does
either one of these two things, textbooks are in effect increasing the chance that a student
will progress to a higher grade the following year.

3.3 Decision Criteria
Because CONALITEG has been in operation for so long, examining the costs and
benefits of a “with the program” and “without the program” world is not feasible.
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However, there are several options for comparing the costs and benefits. First, because
the program sets yearly goals of production and distribution quantities, it could be
possible to compare the current costs and benefits with the projected costs and benefits to
expand the program to reach future goals (for example, comparing 2008 costs/benefits
with projected 2012 costs/benefits). The potential problem with this approach is that
projecting future costs would be almost entirely hypothetical, since the program has not
steadily expanded in any consecutive years; determining incremental expansion costs
may be too difficult.
The second possible approach is to use available data from past years; in this case,
the “without” analysis may be the costs and benefits associated with continuing the
production and distribution at the exact same costs for a base year (2000 for example)
and the “with” analysis of expanding the way the program actually did in the following
years (from 2001-2008). In analyzing costs and benefits this way, though, we would have
to assume that the program costs would have remained completely unchanged for the
“without” analysis, an assumption that very clearly contradicts the actual trends of the
program.
The third possibility is that instead of setting an arbitrary “without” base year and
assuming that program costs would continue at that level indefinitely, it would be
possible to simply choose a timeframe (2000-2008) and analyze the costs and benefits
present during that time in order to determine if the program is worthwhile. In this case it
would be hard to identify a “without” case; rather, the decision criteria would simply be
whether the present value (PV) of costs is less than or equal to the present value of
benefits for the time period. Given the available data on both costs and benefits, the final
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approach is used in this analysis. The timeframe in question, as determined again by the
availability of a full set of cost and benefit data, is the 2008-2009 school year.

3.4 Costs
The costs associated with the CONALITEG program can be broken into two broad
categories: direct program costs and opportunity costs. Each category is described in
more detail below.

Program administration costs (broken down by CONALITEG into four categories)


Wages/employment: This would only include wages paid to employees
who work directly for the CONALITEG program. Employees in the book
publishing firms, for example, are paid by their own companies and not
counted as a cost for CONALITEG.



Materials and provisions: Payments to book publishers for acquisitions
and transportation costs to deliver the books.



General services



Property: This category includes the maintenance for the plant that
CONALITEG owns and operates to produce a small fraction of the
necessary books itself.

Opportunity costs


To publishers: The government buys the textbooks at a wholesale 40
percent discount; thus, if publishers sold in a competitive market they
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would receive a higher price. The difference between the government
wholesale price and the market price is the opportunity cost for publishers.
If we assume that all books would be sold in the private market, this is an
upper bound for the publishers’ opportunity cost.


CONALITEG production plant: The plant used to produce books could be
used for another purpose. To impute the opportunity cost of this space, we
use land rental values in the Querétaro region.

Calculation of these costs gives the following values (in pesos):11
• Direct program costs12
Wages/employment
92,753,782.37
Materials and provisions
1,838,703,581.94
General services
132,847,055.19
Property maintenance
+ 5,105,145.74
Total direct cost: 2,069,409,565.24 pesos
• Opportunity costs
o To publishers:
Market value of books:
864,028,225
13
Payments received from CONALITEG:
- 518,416,935
Subtotal opp. cost: 345,611,290 pesos
o Production plant:
(Plant square meters)x(rent per square meter) = land value
34,844
x 1930
Subtotal opp. cost:
67,248,920 pesos
Thus, the total upper bound present value of costs is 2,482,269,775 pesos, or US
$222,625,029.

11

The peso: dollar conversion rate for 2008 is 11.15:1
“Ejercicio Presupuestal por Capitulo de Gasto,” May 2009. Comision Nacional de Libros de Texto
Gratuitos. http://www.conaliteg.gob.mx/index.php/finanzas.
13
“Programa Federal de Secundaria,” July 2009. Comision Nacional de Libros de Texto Gratuitos.
http://www.conaliteg.gob.mx/index.php/finanzas.
12
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3.5 Benefits
The most apparent benefits from the CONALITEG program accrue to the
students who receive the books and to their families while indirect benefits accrue to the
communities in which the recipients are located. There are several potential
complications with calculating all of the combined benefits, however. Throughout the
analysis we only consider benefits accrued to the students or communities due to books
received in the 2008-2009 school year; some of these benefits will transfer into the future
while others are received immediately.
There is some evidence, as discussed previously, that receiving textbooks and
other classroom materials encourages more school attendance. Recalling work by Jacoby
(1994) that found that the provision of textbooks in schools has a positive effect on
school progress, and the findings from some authors (Lockheed et.al. 1986, Heyneman
et.al. 1984) that academic achievement improves with the presence of textbooks, we
conclude that simply having more textbooks could increase the chance that students
attend or successfully progress through school. The extra schooling that these students
receive has the potential to lead to increased earnings in the future.
Many studies have examined the relationship between years of schooling and
earnings, as discussed in Chapter 1. Expected earnings increase dramatically with high
school graduation and even more with college education. An extra year of secondary
education increases expected earnings by approximately 12 percent in Mexico according
to Schultz (2004) in his study of Mexico’s Progresa program. If we expect that the
provision of textbooks will increase the education that students receive, then we can
expect some increase in future earnings for these students. First, we must determine
whether to count students in primary school, secondary school, or both. Given the fact
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that in 2005, 58 percent of workers in the labor force had a primary school education,
while only 19 percent had completed secondary school, we would expect to see a much
higher return to secondary schooling than to primary, given the relative scarcity of the
former group (World Bank Group 2010). However, according to the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) in its 1998 report, the average return to primary schooling in
Mexico is 14 percent,14 higher than the calculations of secondary returns from Schultz
(2004) and the IDB, at 12 and 11 percent respectively (ESPLA 1998). Unfortunately,
because the CONALITEG information regarding payments to publishers is only for
secondary school books, we must restrict the benefit calculation to secondary students as
well. The implications of this restriction will be addressed in the conclusion. Given the
sample of secondary students, we must determine how to calculate the value of the extra
schooling.
If, as Jacoby estimates, the provision of textbooks (either by the family or the
school) makes a student 20 percent less likely to repeat a grade/fall behind in school/drop
out, then we can calculate the increased expected value of wages for students who receive
textbooks. Unfortunately, we do not have information on how many extra years of
schooling textbooks induce. Thus, we can conservatively estimate that receiving a
textbook in one year only impacts a student’s likelihood to attend the following year. In
reality, the effect from a textbook in year t may reach beyond year t+1, but because this
effect will vary from student to student and thus is hard to quantify, we assume here that
lasting effects do not exist. Ultimately, this assumption will serve to potentially bias our
benefits estimate downward. Using this information, the extra benefit for each secondary
14

This average obscures a large gap between rural and urban returns to primary schooling, however; rural
returns are about 8 percent while urban returns are close to 17.
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student per additional year of school is 0.2*(0.12)*(wage without extra
school)=0.024*(wage without extra school). As a lower bound, we use one percent
increased attendance probability and thus consider 0.01*(0.12)*(wage without extra
school)=0.0012*(wage without) as our worst-case scenario regarding individual benefits.
These benefits are expressed per student per extra year of school. The total benefit to
students, then, is simply this lifetime discounted value times the number of students
affected by the program.
According to the Mexican National Institute of Geography, Statistics, and
Information, the total number of 13-15 year olds in 200515 was 6,537,062. Of these, 82.5
percent were enrolled in school, giving us 5,393,076 students of secondary school age.
Unfortunately, this estimate does not account for students who are between 13 and 15
years of age but attend primary school or for older secondary school students still
enrolled in school. The roughly 5.3 million students, then, could under- or overestimate
the true number of students enrolled in secondary school. I assume for this analysis that
the two competing effects cancel out, and that the 5.3 million students is a close estimate.
The final pieces of information necessary to calculate the present value of the
individual student benefits are the wage and discount rate. In order to continue our
analysis of upper and lower bounds, two different wages are used. The lowest official
minimum wage in Mexico is 53 pesos a day, while the average wage is 209 pesos a day,
according to the Mexican Social Security Institute (Mexico Facts). If we assume that the
average laborer works six days a week for 50 weeks during the year, then the two yearly
salaries are 15,900 pesos (minimum wage) and 62,700 pesos (average wage).

15

The most recent data regarding school enrollment is from 2005, thus it is used to proxy the 2008
numbers.
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Because the benefits connected to increased earnings are discounted over a
student’s lifetime, we must choose a discount rate and time span over which to discount.
A 30-year time horizon is reasonable in this case in order to capture the majority of a
student’s adult working years. The Mexican rate for 30-year government bonds is 6.75
percent, so we will use this as a lower bound. A discount rate of three percent is typical in
studies associated with the macroeconomy because it mirrors the growth rate. Although
this study focuses on individual student benefits, the result is an aggregation of all
benefits and costs on a macro level; thus, the three percent discount rate serves as an
upper bound.
By combining all of the information thus far, we can calculate various levels of
benefits accrued to students from the CONALITEG program. Appendix A details the
iterations of benefits using various combinations of the discount rate, wage, student
population, and increased attendance probability. The upper bound for the present value
of student benefits from these calculations amounts to 163,839 million pesos ($14,694
million); the lower bound, or worst-case scenario, amounts to 1,398 million pesos ($125
million). By examining the net present value calculation in Appendix A, we see that all
but the two worst-case scenarios result in a positive NPV for the program, despite only
having considered student benefits thus far.
Community benefits from increased education are difficult to measure, as
discussed in Chapter 1. Most societal benefits stemming from education come through
the individual student. For instance, improved health and reduced propensity for criminal
activity are two personal benefits that could create positive externalities for the
community. In her review of the literature linking education with social benefits, Stacey
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(1998) comments that in general, “rates of poverty, out-of-wedlock childbearing, early
family formation, and child abuse and neglect are all substantially lower among highschool graduates than among dropouts” (57). Similarly, the IDB reports that basic
education is socially desirable, because it provides a foundation for future benefits such
as improved health, lower birth rates, and higher standards of living (ESPLA 1998). If we
expect CONALITEG to increase school progress and attendance and/or learning
outcomes, then it is reasonable to expect that some, if not all, of these social elements are
affected as well. Crime rates and health outcomes are also commonly cited areas of social
benefit from increased education.
Unfortunately, when it comes to actually valuing these social improvements there
is very little data. Hedonic pricing models would give us the clearest way to measure
society’s willingness to pay (WTP) for lower crime rates, decreased teenage pregnancy,
etc. In the context of CONALITEG, we would need to measure pricing in various
communities in Mexico in order to create the imputed benefit from social improvements.
Once we had a measure for WTP for decreased crime, for example, we would still need
to measure how much crime decreases for each extra year of schooling that a child in the
community receives. Data for the relationship between years of schooling and specific
social outcomes is more prevalent for the United States than for Mexico, however, and is
difficult to find.
Despite the fact that we cannot independently calculate a WTP for improved
community benefits from the CONALITEG program, we can clearly identify a threshold
value that would allow all net present value calculations, even in the worst-case scenario,
to be positive. Because the lower bound of student benefits is 1,398 million pesos and the
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costs are 2,482 million pesos, the NPV is -1,084 million pesos. Using this information,
we can conclude that if community benefits from the program total at least 1,084 million
pesos, then the program will pass our decision criteria requirements.

3.6 Conclusions
Despite the fact that the benefits associated with the CONALITEG program were
difficult to identify and quantify, we can reach a firm conclusion regarding the program
during the 2008-2009 school year. First, we must recall the decision criteria set forth
earlier, namely that the net present value of

be greater than or equal

to zero. We will examine the final values of this equation at an upper bound and a lower
bound (the extremes being derived from the various benefits calculations earlier that
iterated combinations of discount rates, attendance probabilities, and wages).
At an upper bound,16 the present value of benefits totaled 163,839 million pesos
while the costs totaled 2,482 million pesos. Thus, the decision criteria calculation is
(163,839,418,665 -2,482,269,775) = 161,357,148,890 pesos ($1,4471,493,200), a value
far greater than zero. In the upper bound case, then, the program passes the CBA.
At the lower bound,17 the present value of benefits totaled 1,398 million pesos
while the costs were constant at 2,482 million pesos. Our NPV is (1,398,022,4012,482,269,775) = -1,084,247,374 pesos (-$97,241,917). At the lower bound, then, the
program does not pass. However, as mentioned earlier in the benefits discussion, the total
benefits used here only encompass individual student benefits and leave out positive
16

Benefits using a 3 percent discount rate, an average wage of 219 pesos/day, and a 20 percent increase in
the probability that students will attend the next grade.
17
Benefits using a 6.75 percent discount rate, a minimum wage of 53 pesos/day, and a 1 percent increase in
the probability that students will attend the next grade.
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externalities. The justification for this omission hinges on the fact that there is not any
willingness to pay data that would indicate an approximate value for the positive
externalities. In order for the program to pass at this lower bound, however, we know that
the WTP for positive externalities associated with the program would need to collectively
total 1,084 million pesos. Because the Mexican population is about 107 million people
(Mexico Facts), this WTP works out to approximately 10 pesos per person per year. If the
true WTP is at least 10 pesos (which is a small amount given that minimum wage
workers earn 15,900 pesos per year), then the project passes even at a lower bound.
Overall, from a cost-benefit analysis perspective the CONALITEG program is a
good use of public funds because the NPV

is positive in almost all

cases. Furthermore, even in the extreme cases that yield a negative value, the positive
externality valuation almost certainly makes up the difference. Thus, CONALITEG
should continue to function.
There are several components of this analysis that relied heavily on assumptions,
however, and any changes to those assumptions could change the conclusions presented
herein. First, the analysis only evaluated students at the secondary level. Given the
evidence from the IDB that indicates returns to primary education may be higher than
those for secondary schooling (ESPLA 1998), it would be important to include primary
school students in future evaluations. Although we do not have specific data, we can
make several assumptions given our secondary school results. We know that the benefits
for primary school students will be larger given the higher rate of return coupled with the
larger primary student population. Similarly, we know that costs will be higher for two
reasons; first, more students means more books, which cost more to procure. Second,
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more books require more employees and higher costs for transportation. However, there
may also be some components of costs that will overlap with the secondary school costs;
for example, administrative and management costs are most likely shared among all
students, and adding primary school books would not increase these costs by a
proportional amount. Thus, evaluating primary school students as well would most likely
increase benefits more than costs, and would therefore provide further support for the
CONALITEG program.
The primary concern with this analysis, however, lies with the assumption of
benefits tied directly to the CONALITEG program. If more research is done regarding
the impact of textbooks on school progress or future earnings, then the benefits to
individual students might change dramatically. Likewise, values for the improved
community aspects as a result of better schooling are not well researched. This analysis
proposes a minimum level that would make the program worthwhile, but data that
imputes a true WTP would lead to more accurate analyses in the future. Despite these
shortcomings, however, the CONALITEG program appears to incur benefits that far
outweigh the costs, thus justifying its continued presence in the Mexican education
system.
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Chapter 4: Policy Implications
There is substantial evidence to support investment in education from an
economic standpoint. Private returns to schooling in both developed and developing
nations are consistently positive and reflect the value of extra schooling in an individual’s
wage; estimates from the IDB suggest that primary education increases expected future
earnings by 14 percent in Mexico, an increase that amounts to roughly US$215 more per
year for a minimum wage worker (ESPLA 1998).18 Such an increase on an individual
level translates to a positive return on a national scale as well. Despite some authors who
suggest that the link between education and macro-level growth is tenuous, the majority
of studies provide strong evidence to support a positive link. Given current levels of
educational and physical capital stocks, authors such as Krueger and Lindahl (2001)
show that increased education leads to an increase in GDP. If this is the case, then both
private and social returns to investment in schooling suggest that countries would benefit
from encouraging the expansion of access to education as well as high levels of
enrollment. The pragmatic issue is how governments should encourage this expansion of
enrollment.
There are macro-level policies that, given the evidence presented here, would
serve to increase access to education as well as enrollment levels. Based on the results of
the regression analysis, children who live in a community with a high school or
university are about one percent more likely to enroll in school than are their counterparts
who only have an elementary school present. Public construction of higher education
18

The minimum wage used here is 16,900 pesos, 14 percent of which is 2,366 pesos. The 2005 peso to
dollar conversion rate is 10.94.
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facilities, therefore, would not only directly increase access to these schools but would
also serve to increase the probability of school enrollment at all lower levels as well.
Similarly, children whose parents have completed secondary school are about two
percent more likely to enroll than children whose parents only completed primary school.
Thus, if education is encouraged on a large scale during the parents’ generation, then the
effects will carry into the subsequent generation. Public expenditures on schooling are
not a one-time-period investment.
Another macro level policy concern is whether children should be discouraged
from joining the workforce. Given the results of the analysis presented here, children who
work during their secondary school years are 9.3 percentage points less likely to enroll in
school than are their counterparts who do not work. Not only is this result both
economically and statistically significant, but it is also the largest single determinant of a
child’s enrollment decision in the model. If increased enrollment is the government’s
primary goal, then discouraging children’s participation in the workforce is a welltargeted policy. However, there are other consequences to consider when evaluating such
a policy. As discussed previously, low-income households have the highest percentage of
children who work, indicating that the extra income generated by the child is necessary
for household expenses. If children were not permitted to work, they would not
necessarily enter school instead; rather, they might find alternate methods of supporting
household production, such as caring for younger siblings while the parents take on extra
employment. The relationship between child employment and school enrollment is
therefore not clearly defined, and more information is necessary before policies should be
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enacted. Further studies that collect data regarding reasons for child employment are
important next steps.
In addition to macro level policies that would increase both access to education
and actual attendance, there are micro level components that appear to be important as
well. An examination of the private direct costs of schooling yields several interesting
results. The fact that direct costs for primary and secondary schooling are not
systematically different implies that programs aimed at alleviating these costs should
target the entire school system, not just one level. Contrary to the belief that secondary
schooling is both more expensive and more valuable (a belief that is contradicted by the
IDB study discussed above) than primary education, the evidence here suggests that
Mexican households would benefit equally from subsidies aimed at tempering the costs
of both primary and secondary schooling. However, despite the fact that households
would receive the same degree of financial relief from subsidies aimed at primary and
secondary schooling, the non-financial consequences of such government assistance
differ noticeably between primary- and secondary-student households.
The results of the econometric analysis presented in this thesis argue that direct
costs are statistically significant determinants of a child’s enrollment in school, more so
for secondary students than for the entire sample. If direct costs were to decrease by one
standard deviation (2664 pesos), then the probability of a secondary school student
enrolling would increase by 1.57 percentage points (compared with a 0.53 percentage
point increase for all students combined). This result suggests that changing private direct
costs has a larger impact on secondary enrollment than on primary. In this case, subsidies
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that aim to increase enrollment should focus on alleviating direct costs to secondary
school students.
Given this evidence, Mexico’s programs that attempt to alleviate direct costs,
such as the CONALITEG textbook program, appear to address the appropriate obstacles.
Not only does CONALITEG target a statistically significant deterrent to enrollment
(direct costs), but it is also economically efficient from a cost-benefit analysis standpoint,
producing more aggregate benefits than costs. The analysis here was restricted to
secondary school students, which suggests that CONALITEG, in reality, produces even
more benefits than are measured in this study. Future government policies aimed at
improving enrollment and access to education should follow a similar model and target
other aspects of direct costs, such as tuition, fees, and other materials. Further studies
should focus on separating the components of direct costs in order to determine the effect
of each individual cost on enrollment decisions; with this more specific information,
public policies aimed at increasing enrollment can specifically target the direct cost
component that most strongly impacts a child’s enrollment choice. It is clear from this
analysis that future policies should focus on alleviating direct costs and increasing
community support for education in order to reach the goal of universal primary and
secondary education in Mexico.
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Appendix A: Net present value calculations for CONALITEG
Table A-1: 1% increase in enrollment probability, 12% increased in expected future earnings (in pesos)
Minimum wage
Average wage
Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
PV ben/student
PV ben total
PV costs total
NPV
NPV in $US

3%
19.0800
18.5243
17.9847
17.4609
16.9523
16.4586
15.9792
15.5138
15.0619
14.6232
14.1973
13.7838
13.3823
12.9926
12.6141
12.2467
11.8900
11.5437
11.2075
10.8811
10.5641
10.2564
9.9577
9.6677
9.3861
9.1127
8.8473
8.5896
8.3394
8.0965

6.75%
19.0800
17.8735
16.7434
15.6846
14.6929
13.7638
12.8935
12.0782
11.3145
10.5991
9.9289
9.3010
8.7129
8.1620
7.6459
7.1624
6.7095
6.2853
5.8878
5.5155
5.1668
4.8401
4.5340
4.2473
3.9788
3.7272
3.4915
3.2707
3.0639
2.8702

3%
75.2400
73.0485
70.9209
68.8553
66.8498
64.9027
63.0123
61.1770
59.3952
57.6652
55.9856
54.3550
52.7718
51.2348
49.7425
48.2937
46.8871
45.5214
44.1956
42.9083
41.6586
40.4452
39.2672
38.1235
37.0131
35.9350
34.8884
33.8722
32.8857
31.9278

6.75%
75.2400
70.4824
66.0257
61.8508
57.9398
54.2762
50.8442
47.6292
44.6175
41.7963
39.1534
36.6777
34.3585
32.1859
30.1508
28.2443
26.4583
24.7853
23.2181
21.7500
20.3747
19.0864
17.8795
16.7489
15.6899
14.6978
13.7684
12.8978
12.0823
11.3183

385
2077389758
2482269775
-404880017
-36312109

259
1398022401
2482269775
-1084247374
-97241917

1519
8191970933
2482269775
5709701158
512080821

1022
5512956261
2482269775
3030686486
271810447
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Table A-2: 20% increase in enrollment probability, 12% increase in expected future earnings (in pesos)
Minimum wage
Average wage
Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
PV ben/student
PV ben total
PV costs total
NPV
NPV in $US

3%
381.6000
370.4854
359.6946
349.2181
339.0467
329.1715
319.5840
310.2757
301.2386
292.4646
283.9462
275.6760
267.6466
259.8510
252.2826
244.9345
237.8005
230.8743
224.1498
217.6211
211.2827
205.1288
199.1542
193.3536
187.7219
182.2543
176.9459
171.7921
166.7885
161.9306

6.75%
381.6000
357.4707
334.8672
313.6929
293.8575
275.2764
257.8701
241.5645
226.2900
211.9812
198.5773
186.0209
174.2584
163.2397
152.9178
143.2485
134.1906
125.7055
117.7569
110.3109
103.3358
96.8017
90.6807
84.9468
79.5755
74.5438
69.8302
65.4147
61.2784
57.4037

3%
1504.8000
1460.9709
1418.4183
1377.1052
1336.9953
1298.0537
1260.2463
1223.5401
1187.9030
1153.3039
1119.7125
1087.0995
1055.4364
1024.6956
994.8501
965.8739
937.7416
910.4287
883.9114
858.1664
833.1713
808.9042
785.3438
762.4697
740.2619
718.7009
697.7678
677.4445
657.7131
638.5564

6.75%
1504.8000
1409.6487
1320.5140
1237.0155
1158.7967
1085.5238
1016.8842
952.5847
892.3510
835.9260
783.0688
733.5540
687.1700
643.7190
603.0154
564.8856
529.1669
495.7067
464.3622
434.9997
407.4939
381.7273
357.5900
334.9789
313.7976
293.9556
275.3682
257.9562
241.6451
226.3655

7704
41547795164
2482269775
39065525389
3503634560

5185
27960448021
2482269775
25478178246
2285038410

30380
163839418665
2482269775
161357148890
14471493200

20445
110259125214
2482269775
107776855439
9666085690
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